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ROBERT KRAMER
THE year 19571 was not a particularly notable one so far as develop-
ments in the field of federal gift and estate taxes are concerned.
Indeed, with considerable justification one might contend that what did
not happen during 1957 was more significant than what did happen.
The Supreme Court did not hand down a single decision in this field.2
Congress enacted no legislation affecting these taxes.3 The Treasury
did not issue the gift and estate tax regulations under the 1954 Code.4
The year 1958 promises to tell a different story. The Supreme Court
almost certainly will decide one important case. A tax measure of
some sort seems virtually certain of enactment by Congress.! And
the Treasury presumably will not delay issuance of the long awaited
regulations for another full year.
Judging by the provisions of the proposed Technical Amendments
Bill of 1957,1 as reported out of the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee, there was little indication that Congress was ready to undertake
any drastic revision of the gift and estate tax sections of the 1954
Code. Of the five provisions relating to these taxes in the bill, three
were of minor interest.8 One, section 57, adds a new section 2517 to
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1 This paper is written with an editorial deadline of October 15, 1957.
2 The Court denied petitions for certiorari in several cases. Shedd v. Commisnioner,
352 U.S. 1024 (1957); Heringer v. Commissioner, 352 US. 927 (1956); Bowden v. Com-
missioner, 352 U.S. 916 (1956); DuPont v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 878 (1956); Sweet
v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 878 (1956); Woolsey v. Commissioner, 352 US. 832 (1956).
3 The House Ways and Means Committee has submitted a favorable report on HR.
8381, 85th Cong, 1st Sess. (1957), the Technical Amendments Bill of 1957, which contains
six sections affecting gift and estate taxes.
4 Proposed estate tax regulations were issued on October 16, 1956; proposed gift tax
regulations were issued on January 3, 1957. See Johnson, The Proposed Federal Estate
Tax Regulations, 34 Taxes 822 (1956) ; Kirby, Proposed Estate Tax Regulations, 96 Trusts
& Estates 12 (1957) ; Nossaman, The Proposed Gift Tax Regulations, 96 Trusts & Estates
108 (1957) ; Rodman, The Proposed Estate Tax Regulations-Estates of Nonresidents Not
Citizens, 96 Trusts & Estates 79 (1957); Young, Proposed Estate Tax Regulations, 95
Trusts & Estates 1080 (1956); 1956 Ann. Survey Am. L. 145, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 739
(1957).
5 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 241 F.2d 690 (3d Cir.), cerL granted,
354 U.S. 921 (1957). See Merchant's Natl Bank v. United States, 246 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 881 (1957); Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir.), cerL
denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957); Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F2d 210 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957).
6 See note 3 supra and notes 7-8 infra.
7 H.R. 8381, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957).
8 Section 53 extends the period of limitation for filing claims for the credit for state
death taxes under § 2011(c) of the 1954 Code (and also § 813(b) of the 1939 Code).
Section 54 extends the period within which credit for state death taxes may be claimed
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the 1954 Code to exempt from a gift tax an irrevocable election by an
employee to have benefits paid to a survivor under certain pension,
stock bonus, or profit-sharing plans. In general, the benefits under
section 2517 are to be similar to those conferred for the estate tax
under section 2039(c). The exemption extends only to "qualified
plans" and only to benefits attributable to the employer's contributions.
Section 56 of the proposed bill is an attempt to deal with the
controversial subject of the premium payment test for insurance on
the life of a decedent payable to beneficiaries other than his estate.
The 1954 Code completely eliminated this test, and required inclusion
of such insurance only if the decedent (either alone or in conjunction
with others) possessed incidents of ownership in the policy at his
death. The 1939 Code, as amended in 1942, had required inclusion
of such insurance if decedent either had incidents of ownership or if
he had paid premiums on the insurance'0 (only that part of the insur-
ance proceeds proportionate to the part of the premiums paid by the
insured was taxed). Under section 56, insurance on decedent's life
payable to beneficiaries other than his estate would be included in his
gross estate not only if he possessed incidents of ownership at his
death, but also under the following conditions. If at any time within
five years of death (1) the policy was either purchased on decedent's
life after June 26, 1957, or the decedent possessed incidents of owner-
ship in the policy after June 26, 1957, and (2) during the five-year
period decedent paid any premiums directly or indirectly on the policy.
The amount includible under this section is the same proportion of
the insurance proceeds as the ratio of the premiums or consideration
paid by decedent during the five-year period to the total of all pre-
miums or consideration ever paid for the policy. The section applies
only to estates of decedents dying after the enactment of the bill.
The bill hardly restores effectively the premium payment test. In
fact, it is hard to discover the reasoning behind this provision. Why
was a five-year period selected? If an insurance policy or incidents of
ownership are transferred by decedent in contemplation of death three
on certain reversionary or remainder interests under § 2015 (and § 927 of the 1939 Code)
and also the period for payment of the estate tax on such interests under § 6163 (and
§§ 925-26 of the 1939 Code) when undue hardship is shown. Section 55 makes a slight
technical change in § 2039(c) (2). There have been several bills passed in the House to
amend the 1954 Code. H.R. 8881, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), § 812(c) (1) (F); H.R.
8887, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), § 814; H.R. 5938, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957),
§ 812(e) (1) (D).
9 Under present law such an irrevocable designation of beneficiary, if made Inter
vivos, under a qualified pension plan is a taxable gift to the extent of the benefits paid for
by the employer as well as the employee. Section 2039(c) exempts from the estate tax
benefits paid for by the employer in a similar case. See Lowndes and Kramer, Federal
Estate and Gift Taxes 653-5 7 (1956).
10 See id. at 276-79.
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years before death, the entire proceeds of the insurance are taxable
under section 2035, even if decedent paid no premiums. If the insured
paid any premiums in contemplation of death within three years of
death, a part of the proceeds are includible in his gross estate under
section 2035, even if he did not possess incidents of ownership within
this period."
Turning from congressional proposals to the decisions of the
courts, one encounters little that is novel during the period under
review. A quick glance at the decisions, following in general the order
of the 1954 Code, will confirm this assertion. Of course, there are no
decisions as yet actually interpreting the 1954 Code, and several years
may well elapse before there are. However, in the majority of instances
it is doubtful, unless otherwise noted hereafter, whether the result
reached under the 1939 Code differs from that under the 1954 Code.'
In the contemplation of death area the Government continued to
have little success in the litigated cases." Reading the opinions in
these and similar decisions of prior years, we can take comfort from the
amazing zest for life and unconcern with death shown by our senior
citizens regardless of their age and health.
In Bartlett v. United States14 the court of claims decided that
a trust for a decedent-grantor for her life, with remainder to her
"heirs," did not create an express reversion in the grantor. The court
determined that under New York law'" the doctrine of worthier title
11 Where premiums are paid in contemplation of death within three years of death,
the amount of the taxable transfer is uncertain. Is it (1) the amount of the premiums
paid within three years of death, or (2) a part of the policy proceeds proportionate to
the ratio between the premiums paid by the insured within three years of death, and
the total premiums paid for the policy, or (3) the total amount of the policy proceeds,
or (4) the difference between the proceeds and the cash surrender value at the start of
the three-year period? See id. at 289, 859. Section 56 should certainly be amended to
specify exactly what amount is taxable if, because of premium payments within three
years of death in contemplation of death, insurance proceeds are taxable under both
§ 56 and § 2035.
12 In the discussion hereafter references are made to sections of the 19S4 Code even
though the court decisions actually involved the parallel sections of the 1939 Code, except
as otherwise noted.
13 Duncan v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 264 (D. Mass. 1957) (no contemplation of
death; decedent's age 87); Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. United States, 57-1 CCH
Tax Cases ff 11680 (D. Conn. 1957) (age 69; part in contemplation of death); Browar ky
v. Granger, 148 F. Supp. 665 (W.D. Pa. 1956) (no contemplation of death); E. Coray
Henry, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. f 57079 (held in contemplation of death; decedents
age 92); May Hicks Sheldon, 27 T.C. 194 (1956) (decedent's age 80; no contemplation
of death); Edmund W. Mudge, 27 T.C. 188 (1956) (not in contemplation of death;
decedent's age 65; unfunded insurance trust). See Rea, Life Insurance Gifts Subject to
Rules on Contemplation of Death, 6 J. Taxation 30 (1957).
14 146 F. Supp. 719 (Ct. CI. 1956). Cf. Costin v. Cripe, 235 F.2d 162 (7th Cir.
1956).
15 Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
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did not create a reversion. Despite the apparently contrary position
of the regulations,16 one may wonder if the reversion would be an
express one even if a reversion had been created by the doctrine of
worthier title.
Cardeza v. United States17 involved a situation where the result
might differ under the 1954 Code, even though the language of the
1939 Code does not differ materially from the relevant sections of the
1954 Code. Decedent had a reserved power of appointment over part
of the corpus of a trust which she could exercise only in the event that
she survived all her children and their issue. She died at age 85, sur-
vived by one son, age 64, without issue but able to procreate, married
to a woman age 59. The court ruled that decedent's reversionary
interest had no ascertainable value under applicable valuation prin-
ciples, because of the possibility that her son might marry another
woman and have issue. Therefore, the court held, relying upon a
conference committee report"' and the 1939 Code regulations 0 which
so stated, that the reversion was to be considered as having a value of
zero. However, the committee reports20 in discussing section 2037 of
the 1954 Code take a different position on this point, stating that a
reversionary interest is not to be considered as having no value simply
because it cannot be valued actuarially, provided that the property
could have reverted to decedent under "contingencies that were not
remote." Thus, under the 1954 Code, if the reversionary interest
cannot be accurately valued, the Government, not the taxpayer, may
prevail.
Trusts under which the income and/or corpus are payable to the
grantor solely in the discretion of a third person still threaten to open
up gaps between the estate and gift taxes so that such a transfer may
escape both. Such transfers are generally held not taxable under
section 2038, based upon a literal reading of the Code which applies
only where the power is reserved to the grantor and others. This
results in applying section 2038 when the grantor can revoke only
with the consent of an adverse party, such as a beneficiary, but not
applying the section when a trustee alone with no substantial adverse
interest may revoke.2' Such a result is hard to defend. Recently, the
Tax Court has held that if the trustee may be required to pay part or
16 Proposed Estate Tax Reg. § 20.2037-1(g) (2).
17 57-1 CCH Tax Cases ff 11681 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
18 Conf. Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), 1949-2
Cum. Bull. 295, 297-98.
19 U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17(c) (1) (1951).
20 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A314 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 469 (1954). Cf. Proposed Estate Tax Reg. § 20.2037-1(c)(3).
21 Lowndes and Kramer, op. cit. supra note 9, at 179-82. See Proposed Estate Tax
Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (3).
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all of the income and/or corpus to the grantor, the transfer is taxable
to that extent under section 2036 on the ground that the grantor has
retained the right to possession of the income for his life.2 However,
the seventh circuit has reversed one of these Tax Court decisions.2
The Tax Court had ruled that under local law the grantor's creditors
could reach his entire interest in the trust, which was therefore taxable,
because the trustee was required to pay the grantor both $100 a month,
and, in the discretion of the trustee, additional income not exceeding
the entire income of the trust. The court of appeals interpreted local
law as not allowing creditors to reach the grantor's interest in the trust
in excess of $100 a month (the court held taxable only that part of
the corpus required to produce the $100 a month). The court also
stated that even if the creditors of the grantor could reach the entire
income, the right of the creditors was a right in third persons, not in
the grantor, and therefore not subject to section 2036.24 If the court
of appeals is correct-and its reasoning seems persuasive-the gift
tax aspect of the problem must be considered.
Consistent with its reasoning in the estate tax case that such a
transfer is subject to the estate tax under section 2036, the Tax Court
in several decisions has held that a similar trust is not subject to the
gift tax on the ground that the grantor had not made a complete
transfer 25 Thus where a grantor transferred property in trust and
gave the trustees power to pay her such income and corpus as they
in their discretion deemed desirable for her comfortable well-being and
enjoyment, the Tax Court20 held there was no taxable gift of either
income or corpus. Relying on a prior decision to the same effect,27 the
court said there was no gift of income because the grantor's creditors
under local law could reach her income interest. Relying upon another
prior decision28 in a case distinguishable on its facts (the grantor had
a power to revoke the entire trust which she could exercise alone under
certain conditions) the Tax Court held there was no taxable gift of the
corpus because of the trustee's unrestricted power to invade corpus for
22 Edgar M. Uhl, 25 T.C. 22 (1955), rev'd, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957); Carolyn
P. Boardman, 20 T.C. 871 (1953).
23 Edgar M. Uhi, supra note 22.
24 Proposed Estate Tax Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (3) excludes from § 2036 a power over
income held solely by a person other than the grantor.
25 Sarah G. Vander Weele, 27 T.C. 340 (1957); Alice Spaulding Pao]ozzi, 23 T.C.
182 (1954).
26 Sarah G. Vander Weele, supra note 25.
27 Alice Spaulding Paolozzi, 23 T.C. 182 (1954).
28 Chrisfianna K. Gramm, 17 T.C. 1063 (1951). Cf. Robinette v. Helvering, 318
U.S. 184 (1943) ; Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943) ; Rev. Rul. 54-537, 1954-2
Cum. Bull. 316; Rev. Ru]. 54-538, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 316 (distinguishing the Gramm case
because there the corpus and income were so small that it mas virtually certain the
grantor would in fact be paid the entire corpus).
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the grantor. If, as seems probable, such a transfer is not taxable under
the estate tax, then clearly it should be taxable under the gift tax.D
Generally, the courts have held that a transfer is complete for the gift
tax if the power to alter or revoke is lodged solely in third persons
other than the grantor.30 If the power in the third person is a con-
tingent power-one subject to a real contingency not wholly within
the grantor's control-the possibility that the transfer is still not
subject to the estate tax should certainly make it taxable under the
gift tax.31
The long-mooted problem of the combination annuity and single
premium life insurance policy is apparently headed for a definitive
ruling. In Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith 2 the third circuit,
reversing a district court, held the proceeds of a single premium life
insurance policy taxable under section 2036, even though the insured
decedent had retained no incidents of ownership in the policy, which
had been assigned to the beneficiaries, her children. In order to
obtain the policies from the insurer, the decedent had purchased at the
same time a single life annuity on her life, the combined premiums for
the insurance and annuity equalling 11/10 of the face amount of the
policy. Such policies are not considered as life insurance, but as
investments." Following decisions of the Tax Court and two other
circuits,4 the court held the policy proceeds taxable. The court
refused to follow the contrary decision of the seventh circuit, which
had been affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court.Y Since the
Supreme Court opinion does not reveal how the individual Justices
voted, and since the membership of the Court has since changed con-
siderably, it is impossible to predict how the present Court, which has
granted certiorari, will decide this question. Actually, as the third
circuit reasoned, the annuity and policy seem indivisible, even if sepa-
29 Proposed Gift Tax Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) states that if the trustee has full discretion
to pay trust income to the donor or accumulate it, there is no gift at all if the donor
retains a testamentary power to appoint the remainder among his descendants. The entire
gift is a complete transfer if the donor retains no testamentary power and the remainder
goes to X, but if the exercise of the trustee's power in favor of the donor Is governed by
a fixed standard, enforceable by the donor, there is no gift to the extent of the ascertain-
able value of the rights thus retained by the donor.
80 Lowndes and Kramer, op. cit. supra note 9, at 697-98.
31 Id. at 706-13. Proposed Estate Tax Reg. §§ 20.2038-1(b), 20.2036-1(b)(3),
exclude such a contingent power from a tax under § 2038, but indicate it may be taxable
under § 2036.
32 241 F.2d 690 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 354 U.S. 921 (1957), 25 Gco, Wash.
L. Rev. 721.
33 Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
34 Conway v. Glenn, 193 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1952); Burr v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d
871 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 785 (1946); Cora C. Reynolds, 45 B.TA. 44 (1941).
35 Bohnen v. Harrison, 199 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1952), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 345 U.S. 946 (1953).
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rate contracts. They represent simply a deposit of the premiums from
both contracts with the insurer with a reservation of the income from
this amount to the insured during his life."
Employee annuity problems still plague the courts under the
1939 Code, and some of them, at least, may be far from solved under
section 2039 of the 1954 Code. Thus, in Libbey v. United State'
decedent was in fact receiving annuity payments after retirement under
an annuity purchased for him by his employer. The payments were
to continue for ten years, with the surviving widow entitled to the
unpaid balance if decedent died before the end of the ten-year period,
as he did. Decedent had an option, which he did not exercise, to
convert the ten-year annuity to a single life or joint and survivor
annuity before his actual retirement. The court ruled the benefits
payable to his widow were not taxable because there had been no
transfer of them by decedent to her. Since decedent was actually
receiving the annuity payments at his death, the Treasury apparently
regards the survivor's benefits as taxable under section 2039 on the
ground that there was an annuity here "payable to the decedent" under
a "form of contract or agreement. 38
In Molter v. United States" decedent's widow received two years'
salary from his employer at his death under a survivorship benefit plan.
The employer had reserved the right to revoke or alter the plan at
any time. The court ruled the payments to the widow were not taxable
36 The analogy to the retained life interest is not, however, entirely satisfactory.
Ordinarily, if decedent retains a life interest in property, the property is taxable to his
estate under § 2036 even if the remaindermen sell or dispose of their interests prior to
his death. However, if in the combination annuity-life insurance situation, the bene-
ficiaries of the life insurance surrender the policies for their cash value before the insured's
death, the policies are not included in the insured's estate at his death. Lillie G.
Hutchinson, 20 T.C. 749 (1953).
37 147 F. Supp. 383 (ND. Cal. 1956). In Adeline S. Davis, 27 T.C. 378 (1956),
decedent was receiving annuity payments before death, had elected to receive a joint and
survivor annuity, and retained until death the right to revoke or change the election with
the consent of the insurer. His employer had paid for the annuity. The Tax Court held
decedent had made a transfer, which was taxable under §§ 2036 and 2038 because of his
power to revoke the election. See Winton, Two Estate Planning Devices: Life Insurance
Trusts; Employees Death Benefits, 7 J. Taxation 52 (1957); Bilder, Death Benefits Paid
Under an Express Contract, 34 Taxes 529 (1956); Note, Estate Taxation of Employce
Death Benefits, 65 Yale LJ. 1217 (1957).
38 Proposed Estate Tax Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (example 2). Section 2039 specifies
that it applies to an annuity or payment receivable by a beneficiary "by reason of surviv-
ing the decedent." If the refund is payable to the wife only if she survives the employee,
there is no difficulty here. If the refund is payable to the wife or to her estate, irrespective
of whether she survives her husband, it may possibly be argued that the refund is not
receivable by the wife "by reason of surviving the decedent," because there is no survivor-
ship requirement for the refund beneficiary.
39 146 F. Supp. 497 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
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because decedent had no interest which he could transfer to anyone.
Under the language of section 2039 such a survivor death benefit
raises several difficult problems. First, is there any contract or agree-
ment here, since there is no legal obligation on the employer at any time
to pay the benefits to the survivor-beneficiary? Even if there is a legal
obligation to make payments to the deceased employee in the form of
his salary while he works, section 2039 may require that payments
both to the employee and to the survivor be made pursuant to a
contract or agreement. 40  Second, is there any annuity or payment
payable to the decedent or which he possessed the right to receive prior
to death? The only payment to decedent in this case is his salary. If
he died before retirement and while receiving his salary, perhaps his
salary satisfies the statutory requirement 1 If he had retired before
death and ceased to receive a salary or other payment from his former
employer, it is hard to find any payment payable to him or which he
possessed the right to receive. Third, even if decedent's salary is a
payment to him under section 2039, is it a payment for the requisite
statutory period: "for his life or for any period not ascertainable with-
out reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end
before his death"? If he died before retirement and while receiving his
salary, perhaps the salary is a payment to him for a period which does
not in fact end before his death. If he died after retirement and while
not receiving his salary, it is difficult to see how the required statutory
period is met.42
Family annuities pose equally hard problems. Thus in one case4a
decedent transferred property worth over $96,000 to her two children
who promised to pay her during her life the entire income from the
property, and also to make up any deficiency if the annual income ever
40 The Proposed Estate Tax Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (example 4) indicates that If an
employer "consistently" pays benefits to survivors, even when not legally obligated to do
so, they may be considered as being payable pursuant to a contract or agreement, This
example of the regulations also indicates that, apart from this circumstance, benefits
voluntarily paid a survivor-beneficiary by an employer of the deceased are not taxable
under § 2039 because not paid pursuant to a contract or agreement.
41 See Lewis, The Estate Tax 66 n.15, 69 n.31 (Practising Law Institute 1957).
42 The Proposed Estate Tax Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (example 5) indicates that the
survivor benefits are not taxed under § 2039 if decedent had retired before death and
ceased to receive a salary. If decedent at death has any rights to change or revoke the
beneficiary, the benefits may be taxed under § 2038, or if he could realize on the benefits
by assigning them for value, they might be taxed under § 2041. The committee reports
indicate that if decedent had not retired and was receiving a salary when he died, the
survivor benefits are taxable under § 2039, at least if the employer was legally obligated to
pay them. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A315 (example 4) (1954); S. Rep.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 470 (example 4) (1954).
See note 38 supra.
43 Greene v. United States, 237 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1956).
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fell below $3000 (which it never did). Reversing the district court, the
seventh circuit held the decedent had in effect retained a life interest
in the transferred property falling under section 2036. The form of
the transaction was such that the court had no difficulty in deciding
that there was a retained life estate and not an outright purchase of
an annuity for $96,000 or the purchase of an annuity for part of the
$96,000 transferred, with an outright gift of the rest. The court also
rejected the argument that the transfer was made for full and adequate
consideration, but remanded the case for a determination of the value
of the contingent obligation of the transferees to make good any
deficiency in income below $3000 annually. Since the income appar-
ently never did fall below $3000, the court of appeals evidently con-
sidered that the valuation of the contingent obligation should be made
as of the time of the transfer, and not as of the date of decedent's death.
On this point the decision is opposed to that in Nourse v. RiddelW
by a California district court. Decedent here, when seventy-two years
old, together with her children, created a trust from which she received
the income for life, with remainders to her children. She transferred
about $165,000 to the trust, and her children about $283,000. The
court first ruled that the transaction amounted to a transfer by
decedent of her remainder interest in the $165,000 for a life interest in
the $283,000. Such a view seems a rather questionable one, for the
atmosphere of the creation of the trust is one of mutual gifts among a
family rather than of bargaining." The court further held that the life
interest in the $283,000 constituted adequate and full consideration
for the transfer of the remainder interest to the children. To this
reasoning there are two difficulties apparently overlooked by the court.
First, if the purpose of the requirement of consideration here is to
prevent depletion of the estate of the decedent, was there any considera-
tion since all decedent acquired was a life interest not taxable at her
death?46 This question should be answered in the affirmative, for
decedent did receive consideration in the form of a life income or right
of support (assuming a fair price was paid for the annuity), just as if
she had used all her assets to purchase a single life annuity for herself
from a commercial company. Of course, any unconsumed portions of
44 143 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Cal. 1956), 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1486 (1957), 10 OkIa. L. Rev.
228 (1957).
45 For discussion of the difficult problems of consideration in intrafamily transfers,
see Lewis, The Alimony Trust; When and How to Use this Valuable but Hazardous
(Taxwise) Device, 6 J. Taxation 365 (1957); Pedrick, Familial Obligations and Federal
Taxation: A Modest Suggestion, 51 Nw. U.L. Rev. 53 (1956). See also Comments.
Federal Taxation of Alimony Payments and Property Settlements, 29 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 368 (1957); Tax Aspects of Alimony Trusts, 66 Yale L.J. 881 (1957).
46 Lowndes and Kramer, op. cit. supra note 9, at 310-17.
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her life income will be taxable to her estate at her death. Second, the
value of the consideration received by decedent even if it equalled the
value of the remainder interest she gave her children, did not equal the
entire value ($165,000) of the property in which she retained the life
interest. The last question raises a problem which has not as yet
received a definite or satisfactory answer. Where decedent reserves a
string or power over transferred property, what is full and adequate
consideration sufficient to remove the transfer from the estate tax?
Is it: (1) consideration equal to the entire value of the property which
would be included in his gross estate because of the reserved string;
(2) consideration equal only to the value of the part of the property
originally transferred, less the value of the retained interest; or (3)
consideration equal simply to the value of the reserved string, if the
grantor later releases the reserved string? In other words, must the
consideration equal the value of what is transferred, or the value of
what may escape the estate tax because of the transfer? The question
has been raised so far mainly in cases involving joint interests.4 7
The Nourse case seems wrong on another point involving the
method of valuing the life interest received by the decedent in her
children's property. The Treasury valued the life interest on the basis
of the life expectancy of the decedent at the time of the transfer, ac-
cording to the tables of the regulations.4 In fact, decedent lived far
longer than her life expectancy according to these tables. The court
rejected the tables as outdated, but instead of valuing the life interest
according to more modern tables, valued it on the basis of hindsight,
using the actual time decedent lived after the transfer. The court
relied on Tax Court decisions which did reject the Treasury tables, but
which did not use hindsight.49 The court clearly erred in not valuing
47 Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949); Baltimore
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 642 (D. Md. 1955); Commonwealth Trust
Co. v. Driscoll, So F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 137 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 764 (1944). Cf. Mildred Irene Siegel, 26 T.C. 743 (1956); Chase
Nat'l Bank, 25 T.C. 617 (1955). See Lowndes and Kramer, op. cit. supra note 9, at
314-17.
48 In Bowden v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 937 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 916
(1956), the grantor transferred property to a trust, reserving for himself a life Income
of $400 a month from the trust. The court upheld the Treasury's valuation of the
remainder and life interests by use of the tables in the regulations, and refused to value
the retained interest of the grantor on the basis of what a similar commercial annuity
would cost.
49 John P. Hoelzel, 28 T.C. 384 (1957); Shauck E. Barlow, 13 T.C. 760 (1949);
Nellie H. Jennings, 10 T.C. 323 (1948); John Halliday Denbigh, 7 T.C. 387 (1946).
In all these cases, where a life tenant was seriously ill when decedent died, the Tax
Court used the apparent life expectancy of the sick life tenant at the time of decedent's
death to value the life estate. The court did not value the interest on the basis of how
long the life tenant actually lived. Since annuitants often live longer than others, there
may be some basis for valuing an annuity by special life expectancy tables.
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what the decedent gave and received on the basis of her life expectancy
at the time of the inter vivos transfer and on the basis of the value of
the properties at that time. 50 Another problem not adverted to by the
court was also present. The property transferred to the trust must be
valued as of decedent's death, not as of the time of transfer, but the
consideration received by decedent is valued as of the time of transfer.
Suppose the decedent's property is worth $100,000 at the time of the
transfer, and $200,000 at her death, and the consideration is valued at
$25,000 as of the time of transfer. Is the net value for the gross
estate in excess of the consideration equal to $175,000 ($200,000 less
$25,000)51 or $150,000 (75,000/100,000 x 200,000)? 52 Plainly the
second approach giving an answer of $150,000 is the correct one, since
the test should be what proportion of the transferred property did
decedent receive consideration for at the time of the original transfer.
Goodman v. Granger5s illustrates further aspects of the difficulties
in these cases. There the employer by contract agreed to pay the
employee or his estate for fifteen years after death or retirement cer-
tain annual "contingent compensation." Payments were contingent
upon the deceased duly performing certain services, not engaging in
a competing business, and not having earnings in excess of a certain
amount. The lower court held that the decedent's rights under the
contract were valueless when valued, as they should be, immediately
before his death. The court of appeals, reversing, held the contract
rights should be valued immediately after death, on the basis of an
annuity for a fifteen-year term, using the tables of the regulations.
Both courts agreed that decedent's contract rights were property in-
cludible in his gross estate under section 2033. The court of appeals
referred to the fact that in the case of a joint and survivor annuity
the Treasury method, which it had approved, is to use the cost to the
survivor at decedent's death of a comparable single life annuity for
the survivor based upon the survivor's age at that time 4 (or in some
cases the value is figured from the Treasury tables using the survivor's
life expectancy at the time of decedent's death)." The court perhaps
50 Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
51 So held in William Schoenheit 14 B.T.A. 33 (1928), modified, 44 F.2d 476 (4th
Cir. 1930). Cf. D. G. McDonald, 19 T.C. 672, 690 (1953), atfd, 225 F.2d 621 (8th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 965 (1956).
52 So held in Josephus Parker, P-H 1942 B.T.A. Mem. Dec. f 42228. Cf. Helvering
v. United States Trust Co., Ill F.2d 576, 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 678 (1940).
The court used this method in the Nourse case, discussed in text at note 44 supra.
53 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957). See also Christiemin
v. Manning, 138 F. Supp. 923 (D.N.J. 1956).
51 Rev. Rul. 55-302, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 446. Cf. mearkle's Estate v. Commissioner,
129 F.2d 386, 388 (3d Cir. 1942); Christiernin v. Manning, supra note 53; John L.
Walker, 8 T.C. 1107 (1947); Judson C. Welliver, 8 T.C. 165, 172 (1947).
55 Cf. Grant v. Smyth, 123 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1954), aff'd, 226 F2d 407
(9th Cir. 1955).
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overlooked the fact that another method has also been used, namely,
the difference between (1) the cost of a comparable joint and survivor
annuity just before decedent's death, and (2) the cost of a single life
annuity for decedent just before his death, with no survivorship
feature.5
Other valuation problems were also present during 1957. 57 The
use of replacement cost to value insurance policies on the life of
someone other than decedent which are included in decedent's gross
estate has been approved. "8 The insurance is valued in the same way
as under the gift tax. Cash surrender value alone is not the criterion.
In Delia Crawford McGehee"0 decedent made several outright gifts of
stock in contemplation of death. After the gifts, the corporation,
which had never issued dividends in cash or property, but always
capitalized current earnings and declared stock dividends, issued stock
dividends before decedent died. Most of the stock dividends repre-
sented earnings subsequent to the gifts. A majority of the Tax Court
decided that the stock dividends should be included in the gross estate
as part of the transfer in contemplation of death. If the transfer had
been in trust, and dividends in cash or property had been accumulated
or added to corpus, there is authority for excluding them. 0 When the
transfer is outright, the dividends if paid in property or cash clearly
would not be included. On the other hand, if no stock dividends had
been declared, the earnings, as reflected in the estate tax valuation at
decedent's death of the original stock, would clearly be subject to the
estate tax.' Thus the argument may well be made that the decisive
factor here is whether the earnings have actually been severed from
the corporation, and the reasoning of Eisner v. Macomber 2 would be
followed in that stock dividends which represent a mere proliferation
56 Frederick J. Twogood, 15 T.C. 989, 992 (1950), aff'd, 194 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.
1952). Cf. William J. Higgs, 12 T.C. 280 (1949), rev'd, 184 F.2d 427, 428 n.1 (3d Cir.
1950).
57 See Fitts v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1956) (approving Tax Court
valuation of stock in a close family corporation, based upon financial data), 17 La. L.
Rev. 862 (1957); Cullers v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 611 (8th Cir. 1956) (rejecting Tax
Court valuation of farm); Hughes, "Blockage" in Valuation of Assets for Federal Tax
Purposes, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 702 (1957).
58 DuPont v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 210 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878
(1956). Cf. Proposed Estate Tax Reg. § 20.2031-8.
59 28 T.C. 412 (1957), 57 Colum. L. Rev. 1037. See 54 Harv. L. Rev. 512 (1941).
60 Jacob Gidwitz, 14 T.C. 1263 (1950), aff'd, 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952); James
E. Frizzell, 9 T.C. 979 (1947), reconsidered, 11 T.C. 576 (1948), aff'd sub nom. Burns
v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1949). But cf. Wasserman v. Commissioner,
139 F.2d 778 (1st Cir. 1944); Iglebeart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1935);
B. H. Kroger, P-H 1943 T.C. Mem. Dec. f1 43392, aff'd on this point, 145 F.2d 901 (6th
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 866 (1945).
61 Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
62 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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of capital under that case should be subject to the estate tax here,
particularly since they will escape any income tax. The majority
opinion argued that the stock transferred represented a proportional
interest in the value of the business, and the stock dividends did not
change the proportional interest. Apparently the majority were apply-
ing the income tax tests of the 1939 Code and arguing that if the stock
dividend was not taxable as income under the income tax it was in-
cludible in the gross estate. True, all the dividends represented earn-
ings, and, with one exception, earnings after the transfer in contempla-
tion of death, but the earnings apparently were not severed from the
stock by the stock dividends.P Of course, it is possible that by a
lavish use of stock dividends after stock was transferred in contempla-
tion of death, the value of the stock might be substantially reduced by
the time decedent died. There was no evidence of such a tax evasion
scheme here. The value of the stock transferred did not lessen after
issuance of the stock dividends. The same problems may arise, in the
case of stock dividends paid within a year after decedent's death, if
the alternate valuation date is used. Here the regulations' attempt
to prevent tax evasion by distribution of corporate assets after dece-
dent's death, and also flatly state that all stock dividends declared
within a year of decedent's death are taxable if the alternate valuation
date is used.
The third circuit has ruled that under the 1942 act an exercise of
a power of appointment in favor of the same persons and in the same
amounts as would take in default of appointment is a taxable exercise
of the power under section 2041.5 This is true even if local state law
regards the property as not passing under the exercise of the power.
The past year saw a decided increase in litigation over the marital
deduction. In view of the complexities of this deduction and of lan-
guage used in trusts and wills designed to take advantage of it to the
fullest extent, there is little risk in predicting that future years will
see more and more litigation over this deduction. Some problems of
the 1939 Code may be cured by changes in the 1954 Code. Under the
1954 Code, unlike the 1939 Code, the surviving spouse need not have
the entire income from the trust or insurance proceeds and a power of
appointment over the entire trust or the entire proceeds in order to
qualify the interest for the marital deduction as an exception to the
63 Cf. Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704 (Sth Cir. 1935); B. H. Kroger, P-H
1943 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 43392, aff'd on this point, 145 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1944), cerL
denied, 324 US. 866 (1945). See Lowndes and Kramer, op. cit. supra note 9, at 46S-74.
64 Proposed Estate Tax Reg. § 20.2032-1(d) (1) (iv). Cf. Mass v. Higgins, 312
U.S. 443 (1941).
65 Keating v. Mayer, 236 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1956); Thompson v. United States,
148 F. Supp. 910 (ED. Pa. 1957). See Proposed Estate Tax Reg. § 20.2041-1(d).
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terminable interest rule."6 So, too, under the 1954 Code, unlike the
1939 Code, the transfer of the life estate with the power of appoint-
ment to the surviving spouse need no longer be made in trust in order
to qualify for the marital deduction under the exception to the termin-
able interest rule. Thus it is no longer necessary in order to obtain a
marital deduction to attempt to convert a legal life estate with a power
into a fee simple under local state law, or into a resulting trust.07
More difficulty has been encountered as to the nature of the
power which the surviving spouse must have with the life estate in
order to qualify for the marital deduction under the exception to the
terminable interest rule. What if the spouse has an unlimited power to
invade or consume corpus during her lifetime, but all corpus not con-
sumed at her death goes to designated beneficiaries? The Tax Court,"'
over a dissent, has held such a power sufficient for the marital deduc-
tion; the second circuit,69 also with a dissent, has made a contrary
ruling, stressing that although the spouse could invade and consume
the entire corpus (so that she had a taxable power of appointment
under section 2041), she could not dispose of property unconsumed
at her death. The distinction of the court of appeals seems tenuous
66 Shedd v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
1024 (1957); Sweet v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
878 (1956); Blanchard H. Stallworth, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 9 57168; William
H. A. Warner, P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. II 56278. The House has passed a bill,
H.R. 8381, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), supra note 7, retroactively eliminating this
requirement of the 1939 Code that the life interest and power must apply to the
entire trust. Cf. Reilly v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1957), 35 N.C.L.
Rev. 558, 43 Va. L. Rev. 587, where insurance proceeds were payable for ten
years certain to the surviving spouse, and thereafter to her for life, but if she died
within the ten-year period, the remaining proceeds were payable to the children.
Reversing the Tax Court, the court of appeals allowed the marital deduction for the
actuarial value of the contingent life annuity. The court of appeals ruled that the insurance
proceeds should be divided into two funds, one of which qualified for the marital de-
duction even under the 1939 Code. Compare the position of the Treasury in Rev. Rul.
54-553, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 303, with U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47a(d) (1949).
67 Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814
(1957), 57 Colum. L. Rev. 893, 5 Buffalo L. Rev. 344 (1956); Matteson v. United
States, 147 F. Supp. 535 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 517 (2d Cir.
1956); Harriet C. Evisizor, 27 T.C. 710 (1957). See Anderson, The Marital
Deduction and Equalization under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes between
Common Law and Community Property States, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 1037 (1956). The
House has passed a bill, H.R. 8381, supra note 7, retroactively eliminating this requirement
of a trust from the 1939 Code.
68 Harry A. Ellis, 26 T.C. 694 (1956). But cf. Wallace S. Howell, 28 T.C. 1193
(1957) ; Theodore G. Tarver, 26 T.C. 490 (1956).
69 Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
814 (1957). Under the Proposed Estate Tax Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g)(3), the power
of invasion is sufficient if it is an "unrestricted" one "exercisable at any time during
her life to use all or any part of the property ... and to dispose of it in any manner,
including the power to dispose of it by gift ....
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and dubious, since it is clear that a power of appointment is sufficient
here even if it is exercisable only by deed (during the surviving
spouse's entire life) and not by will."
Where the surviving spouse elects to take against the decedent's
will and to take her statutory share in decedent's estate, her statutory
interest is regarded as passing to her from decedent.7 ' However, if it
is a terminable interest, no marital deduction is allowed for it.72 Fre-
quently it is difficult to ascertain whether the statutory interest of the
surviving spouse is a terminable interest or not under local law.73
In Proctor D. Rensenkouse74 the Tax Court held that amounts ex-
pended for the support of a surviving spouse during the settlement of
the estate-the widow's allowance-were not property passing from
decedent to the surviving spouse under local law and did not therefore
qualify for the marital deduction. The holding seems contrary to con-
gressional committee reports75 and a prior service rulingec which as-
sumed the deductibility of such amounts if they were not terminable
interests. The majority opinion argued that such an interest is not
dower, is not a bequest, and is not inherited. Local law, of course, may
require a different result if it treats the allowance as part of dower or
a statutory substitute.77
Cases continue to litigate the question of whether the interest to
the surviving spouse passes free of or subject to its pro rata share of
the federal estate tax. If the interest is subject to the tax, the amount
of the marital deduction is decreased by the amount of the tax on the
interest."8 The testator, of course, can eliminate the problem com-
70 InL Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b) (5), states that the power is sufficient "whether
exercisable by will or during life .... " A bill passed by the House, H.R. 8381, supra
note 7, retroactively amends the 1939 Code to state expressly that an unrestricted power
of invasion in a surviving spouse is sufficient here even if she has no power to dispose
by will of property unconsumed at her death.
71 Lowndes and Kramer, op. it. supra note 9, at 382.
72 Id. at 386.
73 Crosby v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Fla. 1957) (Ala.; marital
deduction allowed); Traders Nat'I Bank v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 278 (WJD. Mo.
1956), aff'd, 248 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1957) (Mo.; marital deduction allowed).
74 27 T.C. 107 (1956), 25 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 704 (1957).
75 S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 483, 525; H.R. Rep.
No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 380, 478.
76 Rev. Rul. 83, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 395. Cf. Rev. Rul. 56-26, 1956 Int. Rev. Bull.
No. 5, at 10. Proposed Estate Tax Reg. § 20.2056(e)-(2)(a) seems to assume that, if
not a terminable interest, such an allowance is property which passes from decedent
to his spouse.
77 Cf. King v. Wiseman, 147 F. Supp. 156 (W.M. Okla. 1956) (deduction allowed
under Oklahoma law; query if the interest under Oklahoma law really differed from
that involved under Michigan law in the Rensenhouse case).
78 Rose Gerber Jaeger, 27 T.C. 863 (1957) (Ohio law; spouse's share subject to
tax). See also Merchants Nat'l Bank v. United States, 246 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 881 (1957) (Indiana; same result); Babcock v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d
837 (3d Cir. 1956) (Pa. law; contra result).
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pletely by suitable language in his will, but unfortunately many wills
are either silent on the point or contain ambiguous language. In con-
struing the admittedly ambiguous language of one will disposing of a
$14,000,000 estate, the state court judge frankly adopted the reason-
ing that a man of such wealth must have intended to avoid all taxes
possible and therefore would wish the widow's interest to pass tax
free to her since this would reduce the total tax on the estate by almost
$1,300,000. 79
The valuation placed upon a partnership interest by an agreement
among the partners enabling the surviving partner to purchase dece-
dent's interest in the firm without payment for good will was upheld
in a case where there was evidence of real bargaining between the
parties involved.8" Perhaps the most important decisions in this field
were those which ruled that premium payments by closed corporations
for insurance on the lives of shareholders were not taxable as divi-
dends and income to the shareholders. 81
Under the gift tax, litigation was almost wholly centered upon
the annual exclusion. There was widespread comment82 upon whether
a gift to a closed corporation is a gift to the corporation or to the
shareholders. There was general agreement that if the donor is a
shareholder, the value of the gift should be reduced proportionately in
accordance with the proportion his stock represents of the entire issued
stock. There was disagreement whether the basis of the reduction was
(1) that the gift is to the shareholders and a man cannot make a gift
79 Case v. Roebling, 42 N.J. Super. 545, 127 A.2d 409 (Ch. 1956). Cf. Matter of
Burnett, 43 N.J. Super. 534, 129 A.2d 321 (Ch. 1957).
8o Mandel v. Sturr, 57-1 CCH Tax Cases II 11688 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See Mackay,
Effects of 1954 Code and Regulations on Stock Purchase Agreements, 96 Trusts &
Estates 121, 204 (1957) ; Pennell, Tax Aspects of Retiring an Interest in a Small Company
with a Buy-Sell Agreement, 6 J. Taxation 116 (1957); Swados, Death and Nonsense:
The Decline and Fall of the Buy-Sell Agreement, 26 Fordham L. Rev. 189 (1957).
81 Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957), reversing 28 T.C. 19
(proceeds to be turned over to corporation for purpose of purchasing deceased's stock);
Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957), reversing 26 T.C. 1020 (1956)
(proceeds payable to corporation but an equal amount to be paid to stockholder as
deferred compensation), Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 89 (1958). See Freyburger, How
Proposed Regulations Affect Taxation of Insurance Transfers and Death Benefits, 5 J.
Taxation 44 (1956); Lawthers, Prunier Offers No Threat to a Sound Insured Buyout
Plan, 7 J. Taxation 2 (1957); Lawthers, Weakness in Casale Decision: Insolvency
Could Destroy Benefit to Owner-Employee, 5 J. Taxation 342 (1956); Lawthers, Tho
Individual Life Insurance Policy Issued in Connection with a Qualified Employee Trust,
35 Taxes 173 (1957); Swados, supra note 80; Taylor and Maier, Sanders Case Again
Emphasizes Care Needed in Agreements Funded by Insurance, 7 J. Taxation 68 (1957).
82 The case provoking the comment was Heringer v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 149
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 927 (1956), noted in 57 Colum. L. Rev. 240 (1957),
6 Duke B.J. 150 (1957), 29 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 134 (1956), 9 Stan. L. Rev. 806 (1957),
4 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 289 (1957). Cf. Proposed Gift Tax Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1). See
52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 135 (1957).
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to himself;' (2) that the donee is the corporation, but the donor re-
ceives partial consideration for the transfer because of the resulting
increase in the value of his own stock; or (3) that the donee is the
corporation but the gift is partially incomplete because of the donor's
stock ownership. There was sharp disagreement whether if the donees
were the shareholders, any annual exclusion should be allowed. The
problem is whether the donee shareholder receives a future interest
for which no exclusion is allowed. Presumably no one donee (unless
a majority stockholder), acting alone, could obtain the amount of the
gift directly by dividends or liquidation of the corporation-the con-
sent of the other donees would be required . 4 A donee to some extent
could obtain the present value of the gift by selling his stock, but the
owner of a reversion has no present interest even if he can sell his
reversion.8 5
Gifts to minors continue to plague the courts under the 1939
Code. The line often seems to be drawn so fine as to be almost in-
visible when the problem arises of what does or does not qualify for
the exclusion here. One can only hope that section 2503(c) of the
1954 Code may avoid such fruitless litigation. Thus, in George V.
Perkins6 the Tax Court allowed the exclusion when the minor bene-
ficiaries, their parents, or their guardians had the right at any time to
receive all or any part of the trust income or principal. The parents
were supporting the children, and no guardians had been appointed
except in one case. Where no such right to demand income or corpus
existed but the trustee was merely authorized to pay income and
corpus, the exclusions were denied by the Tax Court, even when the
trustees were given the same powers as general guardianssT The
fourth circuit reached a contrary result in a similar situation 3
The widespread adoption by states of the Model Custodian Act
83 This seems to be the view of the Proposed Gift Tax Reg., supra note 82.
84 A gift is a future interest if there are several donees and no one donee may
obtain present enjoyment of the gift without the consent of the other donees. Ryerson
v. United States, 312 U.S. 405 (1941); Skouras v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 831 (2d Cir.
1951), affirming 14 T.C. 523 (1950); Jennie Brody, 19 T.C. 126 (1952); Nashville
Trust Co., P-H 1943 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 43485. Cf. Howe v. United States, 142 F.2d 310
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 841 (1944); John M1. Smyth, P-H 1943 T.C. Alem.
Dec. ff 43211.
85 See Lowndes and Kramer, op. cit. supra note 9, at 763-64, 767, 785-86.
86 27 T.C. 601 (1956). Cf. Munger v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Ala.
1957). See Bronston, State and Federal Taxation: Gifts To or For Minors. 95 Trusts
& Estates 934 (1956); Rogers, Forbes and Smith, Recent Changes in the Rules for
Gifts to Minors (How the Trouble Has Been Cleared Up), 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 585 (1956).
87 Abraham M. Katz, 27 T.C. 783 (1957). Other decisions denying exclusions for
gifts to minors: Herrmann v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1956); Glenn v.
Pitts, 145 F. Supp. 779 (W.DS.C. 1956); William Goehner, 28 T.C. 542 (19S7);
Josephine B. Crane, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. 9 57003.
88 United States v. Baker, 236 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 19S6).
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for gifts to minors may give rise to tax problems.8 9 Under this act,
the custodian of the gift is authorized in his sole discretion to apply
principal and income for the minor's support, education, use, and
benefit, the unexpended income and principal to be paid to the donee
at the age of twenty-one or to his estate if he dies before then. A gift
under this act does qualify for the annual exclusion as a present in-
terest. 0 However, there may be undesirable gift, estate, and income9'
tax consequences for the donor, the custodian, or the parents. Thus,
the Treasury92 has ruled that a transfer by a donor to himself as
custodian for a minor donee pursuant to this act is includible under
section 2038 in the donor's gross estate if he dies while acting as
custodian and while the donee is alive and under twenty-one. Such
transfers also seem subject to section 2036(a)(2), and, if the donor
has a legal obligation to support the donee, to section 2036(a)(1).
Even if the donor is not the custodian, if he is a parent of the minor
donee, the transfer possibly might be included in his gross estate under
section 2036 if the transfer discharges his obligation to support the
donee. 93 If the parent is custodian but not the donor, the transfer
might be included in his gross estate under section 2041, on the ground
that his power as custodian is taxable because it may be used to dis-
charge his obligation to support the minor donee and therefore is
exercisable in favor of himself or his creditors.
89 Schlesinger, When and How to Use the New Statutory Custodian for Gifts to
Minors, 5 J. Taxation 263 (1956); Tenney, Tax Considerations in Gifts to Minors Made
Under New State Custodian Laws, 5 J. Taxation 348 (1956); Widmark, Tax Considera-
tions Under Model Act; Security Gifts to Minors, 95 Trusts & Estates 698 (1956);
Notes, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1476 (1956); 31 St. John's L. Rev. 155 (1956).
90 Rev. Rul. 56-86, 1956 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 11, at 11.
91 See Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 40, at 8.
92 Rev. Rul. 57-366, 1957 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 32, at 20.
93 See Lowndes and Kramer, op. cit. supra note 9, at 145-47.
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